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Abstract
We show that interbank markets are a poor substitute for “broad” banks that operate
across regions or sectors. In the presence of regional or sectoral asset and liquidity
shocks, interbank markets can distribute liquidity eﬃciently, but fail to respond eﬃ-
ciently to asset shocks. Broad banks can condition on the joint distribution of both
shocks and, hence, achieve an eﬃcient internal allocation of capital. This allocation
involves the cross-subsidization of loans across regions or sectors. Compared to regional
banks that are linked through well-functioning interbank markets, broad banks lead to
higher levels of aggregate investment, higher output, and less ﬂuctuations within regions.
However, broad banks generate endogenously aggregate uncertainty.
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11 Introduction
Restrictions on the geographical and sectoral scope of U.S. banks’ operations have been suc-
cessively relaxed over the last two decades. In the wake of these changes, a number of banks
have extended their operations across states either via mergers or by opening branches. Simi-
larly, a reduction in Euro-area regulatory barriers has led to increased cross-national banking.
However, while interbank markets in Europe have largely become integrated, substantial bar-
riers to a fully integrated European banking sector remain (Trichet (2004)). As a result,
European regulators today face a similar question to what American regulators faced twenty
years ago: If interbank markets can be freely accessed by banks, are there gains from removing
restrictions on the scope of banks? The answer to this question depends upon whether in-
terbank markets can replicate internal capital allocations within banks that operate broadly
across regions or sectors. In other words, are anonymous interbank markets where banks
can borrow funds from other banks when faced with unexpected liquidity or asset shocks a
substitute for “broad” intermediaries which operate across regions or sectors?
We argue that interbank markets are a poor substitute for broad banks in the presence
of regional or sectoral asset and liquidity shocks. We adopt the standard view of banks as
intermediaries that provide liquidity to depositors and make risky loans to entrepreneurs.
To secure investment funds, entrepreneurs must pledge collateral whose value is risky, since
they cannot commit to repay loans. Whenever the return on entrepreneurs’ projects is not
perfectly correlated with the value of collateral, the return on investment diﬀers for depositors
and entrepreneurs. In turn, regional shocks to collateral values and liquidity cause these
diﬀerences in return (or wedges) to vary across regions. Regions with high liquidity needs
and high collateral values have low wedges in return on investment, but require the withdrawal
of funds to meet liquidity needs of lenders. Conversely, regions with low liquidity needs and
low collateral values have large wedges in returns leading to the liquidation of investment
projects and excess funds for investment in these regions. Interbank markets can distribute
liquidity eﬃciently. This prevents the termination of projects due to liquidity needs in regions
where the returns for depositors and entrepreneurs are similar. However, interbank markets
fail to take into account the diﬀerential return on investment across regions. Broad banks
that operate across regions can condition on the realized joint distribution of shocks to both
2satisfy the liquidity needs of lenders and eﬃciently allocate investment across regions. This
internal allocation of capital involves the cross-subsidization of some projects ex-post that
have high returns to entrepreneurs, but relatively low returns to depositors. As a result,
broad banks lead to higher levels of aggregate investment and higher output than regional or
sectoral banks with well-functioning interbank markets.
To formalize this argument we analyze an environment with multiple “regions” and region-
speciﬁc liquidity and asset shocks. The basic environment has ﬁve key features. First, lenders
face stochastic liquidity needs (modelled as preference shocks) which generates a deposit
feature. Second, entrepreneurs have projects with returns exceeding the return on a storage
technology. Third, lending contracts are subject to enforcement frictions. We assume that the
repayment of debt contracts is enforced solely by the threat of seizing a collateral good. This
leads to the ﬁnancing of entrepreneurial projects via collateralized debt. The fourth feature
is that the value of collateral is stochastic. As a result, low realizations of the collateral value
induce depositors to reduce or stop lending, since they will be unable to collect on their loans.
Finally, to capture the idea of “regions”, we replicate our basic environment N ≥ 2 times.
Motivated by the observation that bank lending and deposit taking tends to be regionally
or functionally specialized, we assume that depositors and entrepreneurs in each region are
spatially separated from their counterparts in other regions.
We analyze two banking structures. In an interbank market arrangement, banks in each
region are restricted to taking deposits and making loans to entrepreneurs in their region.
There is a competitive interbank market where banks from diﬀerent regions can borrow and
lend taking the interbank interest rate as given. Interbank borrowing is fully backed by
collateral as the rights to seize collateral are transferred between banks. The second structure
formalizes broad banks. Banks are able to operate branches in every region that take deposits
in a region and make loans to entrepreneurs in the same region. Hence, banking activity is still
local. However, banks are now able to directly transfer resources across branches or regions.
When making transfers, banks are constrained by the threat of potential competition from
region-speciﬁc banks.1 We model this threat as an outside option for lenders and entrepreneurs
to form a region-speciﬁc coalition to ﬁnance projects locally.
In the interbank market setup, banks in regions with suﬃciently bad asset shocks terminate
3all projects, as the amount that can recovered from entrepreneurs is less than the return on
the storage technology. These banks are lending on the interbank market. Banks in regions
with a high realization of the asset shock wish to borrow on the interbank market so as
to avoid the liquidation of projects. The allocation of funds within a broad bank is more
complicated as it depends upon the joint realization of the asset and liquidity shocks. As
in the interbank market, broad banks transfer funds from regions with bad asset shocks to
regions with good asset shocks and high liquidity needs. However, the broad bank is able to
extract some of the surplus from entrepreneurs on islands receiving liquidity loans and use it
to cross-subsidize projects in regions with bad asset shocks that would have been terminated
with liquidity provision through interbank markets. Here it is the threat of exclusion from
liquidity motivated loans that induces depositors and entrepreneurs in a region to stay with
the broad bank despite their outside option and to agree with the transfers to cross-subsidize
projects in other regions. Since the cost of exclusion depends upon the joint realization of the
shocks, a negative correlation between liquidity and asset shocks lowers the outside option
and leads to higher transfers, more cross-subsidization and higher aggregate investment.2
Our analysis generates a novel aspect for the relationship between aggregate uncertainty
and banking restrictions. While broad banks reduce idiosyncratic regional risk, they also
create endogenous aggregate uncertainty. The reason is that, with broad banks, the level of
aggregate investment depends upon the extent of cross-subsidization which is a function of
the realized joint distribution of asset and liquidity shocks. Purely idiosyncratic shocks across
regions thus lead to endogenous aggregate ﬂuctuations in the level of investment and output.
With interbank markets and regional banks, investment depends solely upon regional asset
shocks. Thus, idiosyncratic asset shocks lead to variations in the level of regional investment,
but not aggregate investment.
The model has two interesting empirical implications. First, broad bank lending within
a region should respond less to regional asset shocks than that of regional banks. Second,
the removal of barriers to broad banks should lead to a reduction in idiosyncratic output and
investment ﬂuctuations across regions. These implications are in line with recent empirical
ﬁndings on the relationship between restrictions on inter-state banking and real economic
activity in the U.S. Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) ﬁnd that increased interstate banking in
4the U.S. during the 1980s and early 1990s was accompanied by a reduction in the idiosyncratic
variability of state output.3 Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sorensen (2004) also ﬁnd a reduction
in idiosyncratic income ﬂuctuations across states in the U.S. following banking de-regulation.
They argue that this insurance is provided largely through less ﬂuctuations in bank loans to
small business.4
Closest in spirit to our environment is recent work by Diamond and Rajan (2001) and
Kashap, Rajan and Stein (2002) that addresses the question of what makes banks ”special”
compared to other types of types of ﬁnancial intermediaries and markets. Kashap, Rajan and
Stein (2002) argue that banks exist to economize on liquidity. They show that when both
borrowers and lenders are subject to imperfectly correlated liquidity needs that a bank is
able to reduce the amount of reserves needed to provide for suﬃcient liquidity. Diamond and
Rajan (2001) examine an environment with liquidity and asset shocks. They argue that the
ﬁnancial fragility of banks (whereby banks borrow short and lend long) helps banks to commit
not to hold-up depositors. Their work is complementary to ours. We addresses the question
of restricting the scope of bank operations whereas these other papers provide a rational for
the existence of banks. We also diﬀer from these papers in the way we model asset shocks.
Building upon Kocherlakota (2001), we assume that limited enforcement requires lending to
be secured with a risky collateral good.
Also related to our work are Battacharya and Gale (1987), Chari (1989) and Battacharya
and Fulghieri (1994). These papers ﬁnd that interbank markets cannot provide liquidity
eﬃciently and achieve an optimal diversiﬁcation of liquidity risk when a bank’s true liquidity
needs or investment returns are private information. Apart from assuming full information,
our work diﬀers from these papers in two dimensions. First, we analyze a model where
both stochastic liquidity needs and co-insurance against asset risk interact to shape interbank
relationships. Second, we look at the question whether alternative arrangements such as
broad banks could improve upon interbank markets.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the environ-
ment, concentrating on the contractual framework and the enforcement frictions. Section 3
analyzes the provision of liquidity via competitive markets, while Section 4 discusses the fail-
ure of the market solution in achieving eﬃciency and highlights the beneﬁts of broad banks.
5Section 5 discusses the implications of our model and outlines some empirical examples which
match our results. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 An Investment Problem with Default and Demand
for Liquidity
There are three periods t = 0,1,2. The economy is composed of N ≥ 2 locations or “islands”.
Each location is populated by a measure one of both entrepreneurs and investors.
Investors have a single unit of a consumption good and can access a storage technology
with gross return of 1 at any time. With probability ˜ θ (1− ˜ θ) lenders only value consumption
at t = 1 (t = 2), where ˜ θ is a random variable with support Θ ⊂ (0,1). Formally, preferences










L,i if type 1 and realization is θi
c2
L,i if type 2 and realization is θi
,
where ct
L,i is the amount consumed by an investor at t on location i. Preferences at date 0 are
given by expected utility E[uL(c1
L,i,c2
L,i;θi)]. The random variable ˜ θi represents a location-
speciﬁc liquidity shock a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983). A realization θi is interpreted as
the fraction of investors on island i that have a need for liquidity, since they only want to
consume at t = 1.
Entrepreneurs are endowed with an investment project and an indivisible special good,
called collateral. Their project must be initialized at t = 0 and be ﬁnanced continuously
through t = 2 to yield any return. An amount x > 0 of the consumption good invested in
the project at t = 0 yields a return of min{Rx,R} units of the consumption good at t = 2. If
funds are withdrawn from the project at t = 1, the project is terminated and yields no return
at t = 2. New investments at t = 1 are not productive.
Collateral is special since only the individual entrepreneur derives utility from it. With
probability ˜ π (1−˜ π) the collateral’s value is V (0), where ˜ π is a random variable with support
6Π ⊂ (0,1). We assume that entrepreneurs consume only at t = 2, and preferences at t = 2
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In our environment, collateral plays an essential role due to an enforcement problem.
Entrepreneurs cannot commit to payments to lenders at t = 2. They can, however, pledge
collateral which investors can seize in the event of non-repayment of loaned funds. Even
though lenders do not value collateral, it allows entrepreneurs to credibly commit to repay
loans, since losing valuable collateral is costly. Making the value of the collateral stochastic for
entrepreneurs creates a default problem where the random variable ˜ π represents a location-
speciﬁc collateral or asset shock. Assuming a law of large numbers, a realization πi is the
fraction of borrowers with valuable collateral on island i.
To summarize the timing, at t = 0 investors on island i invest x0
i on their island and store
1−x0
i. This initial investment can be seen as a loan commitment to entrepreneurs, made before
information about the liquidity and asset shock is known. At t = 1, ˜ πi and ˜ θi are realized
for each island. The investors’ types and the fraction of entrepreneurs with valued collateral
on each island are publicly known. However, at this point investors and entrepreneurs do not
know which entrepreneurs will value collateral at t = 2. Hence, ˜ πi is a perfect signal about
the overall default problem on island i. Based on this information, lenders decide on the
new investment x1
i(s) and ask for withdrawals x0
i −x1
i(s) ≥ 0. This captures the reversibility
of loan commitments once more information has become available. Entrepreneurs, however,
have the option to refuse to honor the withdrawal requests. If investors can withdraw funds,
they either consume or store them. At the beginning of t = 2 individual entrepreneurs learn
whether they value collateral or not and project returns are realized. Entrepreneurs decide
whether to repay lenders and consumption takes place.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the random variables ˜ θ and ˜ π can both take on
7only N diﬀerent values. Furthermore, we assume that each value occurs exactly once. A state
s of the economy is thus given by an assignment of the N values for each random variable
to the N islands. In other words, a state is a joint distribution of the N values for both
random variables across the N islands. There are N! such assignments and we assume that
they occur with equal probability. Hence, there is no aggregate uncertainty and islands face
only idiosyncratic shocks.6



















i=1, where δi(·) ∈ {0,1} for all states s. The functions δi(·) specify whether the
entrepreneurs lose (δi(·) = 0) or retain (δi(·) = 1) their collateral.
An allocation is feasible if (i) the investors’ consumption in the ﬁrst period is less than
their withdrawals and (ii) total consumption in the second period is less than the return on
investment and storage.
θic1
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Investors have the option of not investing and of withdrawing their funds at t = 1. Hence,
for an allocation to be individually rational for lenders, it must satisfy
c
1
L,i(s) ≥ 1 (4)
c
2
L,i(s) ≥ 1. (5)
for all s. Upon receiving funds, entrepreneurs have the option of not repaying the initial
investment. To borrow, they must pledge their collateral good, which they forfeit when-
ever they do not repay their funds. Hence, for an allocation to be individually rational for






















The ﬁrst constraint compares the expected value of honoring withdrawal requests at t = 1
with the value of continuing investment at the original level. At t = 2, entrepreneurs compare
the value of not repaying and defaulting with the consumption when paying back the loan. If
entrepreneurs have worthless collateral, they always default and consume the entire project
return. We call an allocation incentive feasible if it is feasible and individually rational for
investors and entrepreneurs.
Finally, we make two assumptions. The ﬁrst implies that all withdrawal requests by lenders
at t = 1 will be honored, since the expected cost of defaulting at t = 1 always exceeds the
expected gain for an entrepreneur.
Assumption 2.1. minπi∈Π πiV ≥ R.
The second assumption is on the size of liquidity needs relative to the aggregate size of the
default problem. This assumption restricts our attention to the case where the demand for
liquidity is not so high that it dwarves the overall default problem in the economy.7
Assumption 2.2. Let π1 < ··· < πN and let Γ be the smallest integer such that
P
{i|i>Γ}(πiR−
1) ≥ 0. We assume that Γ ≥
PN
i=1 θi.
3 Liquidity Provision through Competitive Markets
We ﬁrst look at optimal incentive feasible allocations for a single region that cannot trade
funds with other regions. To characterize these allocations we solve an optimal contract
(or planning problem) between depositors and entrepreneurs. As the solution to this problem
exhibits both demandable debt (deposits) and collateralized loans, we interpret it as a banking
arrangement or bank that is associated with each location.
We then look at a competitive market for borrowing and lending funds across locations
or, equivalently, banks. Depositors fund only local projects, but face random liquidity needs.
9Being able to trade liquidity across locations improves welfare since there is no diversiﬁcation
of investment at t = 0. Loans on the interbank market are secured by transfering collateral
rights across locations or banks. This allows funds to be transfered across location, ruling out
a default problem by banks and enabling an eﬃcient distribution of liquidity.
3.1 Regional Banks
Suppose that goods cannot ﬂow between islands at t = 1. This captures the absence of
markets for liquidity or direct exchange of funds at t = 1 after the local liquidity needs
and the collateral shock are known. To ﬁnd an optimal incentive feasible allocation for each
location, due to linearity of the utility functions, we can simply maximize total surplus at


















Assumption 2.1 guarantees that investors decide to advance all their funds initially (x0
i =
1). Withdrawals at t = 1 depend on how large liquidity needs are and on how severe the
default problem is. Since there are no markets for liquidity, each location has to withdraw
a fraction θi of investment to satisfy liquidity demands. Whether the remaining funds stay
invested depends on the average returns on loans on the island. Investors can receive a return
only from entrepreneurs with valuable collateral.
If the collateral shock πi is greater or equal than 1/R, investors can receive a return
greater or equal than 1 at t = 1. Hence, they will keep the remaining funds (1−θi) invested.
Otherwise, the eﬀective return on investment is less than one, since too many entrepreneurs
default at t = 2. In this case, all funds are withdrawn at t = 1. This is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. On islands with average returns from loans greater than 1, an optimal
allocation ﬁnances as many projects as possible after providing investors with liquidity. On







1 − θi if πiR ≥ 1
0 otherwise.
The optimal incentive feasible exhibits both a demandable debt (deposits) and a debt con-
tract feature. These are the two features that deﬁne a bank. The deposit contract feature
arises from the fact that depositors can withdraw funds upon demand either to meet personal
liquidity needs or to liquidate investment on the island in response to information about nega-
tive asset shocks.8 Project ﬁnance resembles collateralized debt as loans are explicitly backed
by borrowers collateral. Whenever an incentive feasible allocation exhibits these features, we
interpret it as a banking arrangement or bank.
3.2 Interbank Markets
Regional banks can now trade funds at t = 1 on a competitive market to meet liquidity needs.
The initial investments x0
i continue to be island speciﬁc. When solving for the equilibrium
outcome, it is useful to look at a local planner designing an optimal allocation for a region at
t = 0 taking as given a competitive interbank market at t = 1. At this stage, the local planner
for each island or location (i) takes the interest rate as given and (ii) demands or supplies
funds on a decentralized market after both shocks have been realized and are publicly known.
The optimal state-contingent allocation continues to resemble a regional banking arrange-
ment. To ensure that loans between locations are honored we allow for the transfer of title
to collateral across islands. Transfers of funds across islands thus correspond naturally to
collateralized interbank lending.
The local planner decides simultaneously whether to borrow or lend on the market at the
gross interest rate RIB and whether to continue funding projects of entrepreneurs on her
island. When making this decision, he still has to take into account the default problem of
individual entrepreneurs and the liquidity demands of investors on her island.
Let zi denote the funds supplied on the market by the planner for island i where zi ≥ 0
(zi ≤ 0) denotes lending (borrowing). Taking into account withdrawals by early investors,
11total resources at t = 2 available for consumption at i are:
Rx
1
i + RIBzi + [(1 − θi) − zi − x
1
i] (10)
where the ﬁrst term describes the gross return from continuing projects in a location, while
the second term refers to the proceeds from supplying loans on the market. The last term
describes the funds not used for investment and hence stored. Thus we require that
x
1
i ≤ (1 − θi) − zi. (11)
Each planner faces a borrowing constraint on the market. Speciﬁcally, the planner can
borrow only up to an amount where the value of the assets at t = 2 after paying lenders in
her own location is greater than the costs of repaying the loan. This ensures that her loan
from the market can be collateralized. The borrowing constraint is given by
−ziRIB ≤ πiRx
1
i + [(1 − θi) − zi − x
1
i] − (1 − θi). (12)
The planner’s net assets are the returns on performing loans and the amount of idle funds less
the pay-outs to lenders. The total costs of fulﬁlling the obligation from borrowing is given
by the principal plus interest. Note that this constraint is endogenous in the sense that it
depends on the interest rate RIB.
3.3 Equilibrium
The planner at each location takes the interest rate RIB as given and chooses an incentive
feasible allocation for his location that maximizes the entrepreneurs utilities. Since x0
i = 1 is
still optimal and the same participation constraints bind as in the optimal allocation on the
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12at t = 1 once the state s is known. An interbank market equilibrium at t = 1 is an interest rate
ˆ RIB and investment levels {ˆ x1
i, ˆ zi}N
i=1 such that given (i) ˆ RIB, the planner for every location i
chooses (ˆ x1
i, ˆ zi) optimally and (ii) the market for borrowing and lending clears (
PN
i=1 ˆ zi = 0).
When making his investment decision at t = 1, the planner compares the rate of return of
investing in projects at her own location with the return on interbank loans. Her choice is
restricted both by the total funds available for investment and the borrowing constraint. It
is clear that any interbank rate above R or below 1 cannot be an equilibrium as the market
would not clear. Hence, RIB ∈ [1,R]. For any interest rate 1 ≤ RIB ≤ R, the planner would
like to borrow so much as to satisfy all liquidity needs, i.e. −zi = θi. This would allow him
to set investment to x1
i = 1 and ﬁnance all projects at t = 1. His obligation is the loan plus
interest (θiRIB) and the investments by the island’s investors (1−θi). Running every project
in his location at t = 1, his assets at t = 2 are πiR.
Comparing assets and debt, whether the planner is constrained depends on the average
return on loans in his location. First, if πiR ≥ RIB ≥ 1 he is unconstrained and will borrow
up to −zi = θi. The fraction of performing loans in the location is so high, that the planner
can fully secure borrowing. Otherwise, he is borrowing constrained whenever her liquidity
needs are too high or, equivalently, when he would like to borrow more than he could repay
with the returns on investment. In this case, the planner is constrained if θi ≥
πiR−1
RIB−1 and, if






i > −θi. (14)
Finally, if 1 > πiR, the planner is borrowing constrained regardless of her liquidity needs.
He can never promise to pay all the loan back, since the planner’s return on loans to local
entrepreneurs is less than 1. Hence, he supplies a positive amount of funds (zi ≥ 0) to the
interbank market. Equation (12) is then a solvency constraint for each location. A local
planner that lends funds would like to use the returns from interbank lending to compensate
for losses on some of the location’s projects which all have a social return of R > RIB.
Hence, investment on every island is positive at t = 1 whenever RIB > 1. Furthermore, total
investment is given by x1
i +zi = 1−θi for every island, since the storage technology is strictly
13dominated. This eﬀect is driving the next result which is formally proven in the appendix.
Proposition 3.2. The unique equilibrium is given by the interest rate R∗
IB = 1 and all projects
on locations with average returns from loans of at least 1 get ﬁnanced. Investment levels at







1 if πiR ≥ 1
0 otherwise.
When RIB = 1 locations with a low average return on loans are indiﬀerent between sup-
plying funds on the market. By Assumption 2.2, there are enough funds for satisfying the
demand for liquidity. For higher interest rates there is always excess liquidity in the market
for RIB > 1.9 Markets work well for providing liquidity where it is needed despite the de-
fault problem. All locations which are solvent (πiR ≥ 1) obtain enough loans through the
market to satisfy their liquidity needs. In fact, none of the borrowing constraints (12) bind
in equilibrium.
4 A Market Failure: Lack of Cross-subsidization
4.1 Broad Banks and Cross-subsidization
We now compare the market equilibrium with broad banks. Banks are broad if they operate
across locations. This is equivalent to looking at a global planning problem. A central planner
decides on the allocation of funds across locations and does not rely upon a decentralized
market with a price mechanism.
The optimal allocation for the central planner still exhibits the crucial features of a bank.
In eﬀect, the planner runs an internal market for investment funds, where each region has
a bank branch or subsidiary that intermediates local lending to entrepreneurs. Branches
must oﬀer terms to local depositors and entrepreneurs that are at least as good as what a
regional bank could oﬀer. This is formalized as an outside option for regions that restricts
the allocations a central planner can choose and is formalized as a participation constraint
for each entire island.
14The central planner can now move goods directly across locations at t = 1 and t = 2.
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This implies that the central planner - after using funds from locations with low returns
for providing overall liquidity - would distribute goods at t = 1 across locations to ﬁnance
as many projects as possible. This involves the cross-subsidization from locations with high
returns from loans (πiR > 1) to other locations in order to induce investors there not to
withdraw their funds at t = 1. Investors on these locations receive then a transfer that
guarantees a return of at least 1. Ex-ante welfare increases, since the objective of the central
planner is strictly increasing in the number of projects ﬁnanced across locations.
Even within a broad bank, there should be limitations on cross-subsidization. Cross-
subsidizing projects means that ex-post some regions make transfers to others. There is then
an incentive for investors and entrepreneurs in these regions to contract with an alternative
intermediary that only operates regionally. We formally model this as an outside option,
which we interpret as the possibility of intermediating investment through a regional bank
at t = 1. This bank matches the deposits of patient investors with the claims on projects
of entrepreneurs. It captures the potential of a regional bank to oﬀer local entrepreneurs
better borrowing conditions than a broad bank which uses funds from lending in that region
to cross-subsidize projects in other regions.10
The incentives of regions as a whole to participate in cross-subsidization at t = 1 after
information on returns and liquidity needs is available, is given by a local planning problem
at t = 1. Let W A
i be the value of the alternative allocation that a local planner for island i
would choose at t = 1 and denote the value of the allocation the central planner chooses for
location i by W C








i (s) ≡ θic1







+ (1 − πi)c0
B,i(s).
Locations with a low average return on loans (πiR < 1) would receive a positive transfer
with cross-subsidization. Hence, their participation constraint will never bind. For all other
locations transfers will be negative and the constraint could be binding. Using Proposition
3.1, the value of an optimal incentive feasible allocation for a single island is given by
W
A
i (s) = R(1 − θi) + θi + V πi, (18)
since the local planner has to stop a fraction θi of projects to satisfy their liquidity needs.





i (s) = 1 + (πiR − 1)x
1
i(s) + Ti(s) + πiV + R(1 − πi)x
1
i(s). (19)
Transfers are also limited by the fact that enforcement of loans with each entrepreneur on
an island is limited. Given investment at t = 1, at most x1
i(s)(πiR − 1)/πi can be extracted
from any entrepreneur that does not default. The next lemma summarizes this discussion
and characterizes the participation constraint (17) in terms of feasible transfers Ti(·) between
locations.
Lemma 4.1. A transfer is feasible if and only if
−Ti(s) ≤ min{θi(R − 1) + (x
1
i(s) − 1)(R − 1),(πiR − 1)x
1
i(s)} (20)
for any i s.th. πi > ¯ π and Ti(s) ≥ 0 otherwise.
Since overall welfare is strictly increasing in the number of projects run across islands at
t = 1, the social planner will make the maximum feasible transfer of funds between islands.
The maximum amount that can be taken from islands with πiR > 1 is given by ¯ Ti(s) =
(−1)min{θi(R − 1),(πiR − 1)}. These transfers go to the islands with the highest returns
on loans with average return on loans less than 1 (i.e., the highest πi’s such that πiR < 1).
16Liquidity needs are ﬁnanced by terminating all projects on locations with the lowest rate of
return on loans. This maximizes the number of projects running at t = 1 while guaranteeing
investors a return of at least 1 on all islands.
Proposition 4.2. The optimal allocation with broad banks ﬁnances as many projects as pos-
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   
1 if πi > ˜ π
˜ x if πi = ˜ π
0 if πi < ˜ π
,
where ¯ π ≥ ˜ π and ˜ x ∈ [0,1] satisﬁes
P
{i|πiR<1} [(πiR − 1)x1
i(s)] =
P
{i|πiR≥1} ¯ Ti(s). Further-
more, the optimal allocation depends on the joint distribution of shocks s, rather than only
the realization of the asset shocks.
Unlike in the market equilibrium, the constrained eﬃcient allocation described in the
Proposition depends on the speciﬁc realization of the joint distribution s. Whereas asset
shocks still determine which islands keep their funds invested, the amount of transfers de-
pends on the size of the liquidity shock for locations with a high average return on loans.
Liquidity shocks serve as a “threat point” to prevent islands from deviating from the alloca-
tion proposed by the social planner. In the absence of liquidity shocks (θi = 0 for all i), the
local planner for any island would never have an incentive to accept a negative transfer at
t = 2.
Strictly positive liquidity needs, however, give value to participating in an allocation with
negative transfers. The maximum transfer a local planner accepts depends on the relative
size of the two shocks, πi and θi, for each location. This determines the value for the island
of staying with the optimal allocation once the shocks are known. Hence, this value depends
on the joint distribution of shocks across islands. The optimal allocation depends then on
the realized joint distribution and, hence, involves endogenous aggregate uncertainty, even
though the economy as a whole is exposed solely to idiosyncratic shocks.
174.2 Ineﬃciency of Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium is not constrained eﬃcient. Both constrained eﬃcient allocations and
equilibrium allocations separate the mechanisms for liquidity provision from the ﬁnancing of
projects. Locations with a suﬃciently high rate of return on their loans receive suﬃcient
liquidity from other islands to keep all projects alive.
While markets can eﬃciently allocate liquidity across islands, they are unable to cross-
subsidize between islands which is preferred ex-ante since it enables the economy to keep
more projects running at t = 1. To the contrary, for any state at t = 1 the social planner
can exploit the liquidity needs of locations and transfer resources across locations in order to
compensate investors for losses on non-performing loans. In fact, the optimal allocation can
be seen as a peculiar way of conditioning on the joint distribution of shocks, thereby eﬀectively
charging diﬀerential interest rates for obtaining liquidity that are always strictly greater than
1. This is impossible in equilibrium, since liquid funds are always in excess supply.
Corollary 4.3. The optimal allocation strictly dominates the equilibrium allocation in welfare
and has strictly higher investment at t = 1 independent of the realized joint distribution of
shocks s.
Finally, the ﬁrst-best allocation in this economy would feature even more investment and no
aggregate uncertainty, since transfers are not restricted to satisfy the participation constraint
(17) and are restricted only by the excess return on performing loans, i.e., Ti(s) ≤ (πiR −
1)x1
i(s). For the constrained eﬃcient allocation, a negative correlation between both shocks
helps to increase investment at t = 1 relative to the ﬁrst-best. This is due to the fact
that the higher the liquidity needs on islands with good collateral shocks, the more transfers
are feasible. Provided liquidity needs are high enough on all islands with πiR ≥ 1 - more
speciﬁcally, θi ≥
πiR−1
R−1 - the participation constraint is not binding for any location and the
allocation corresponds to the ﬁrst-best.
185 Conclusions
Restrictions on the scope of banking matter even in the presence of well-functioning interbank
markets. This is somewhat surprising, as one might think that interbank markets could allow
regional banks to circumvent restrictions on the geographical or sectoral operation of banks.
We show, however, that broad banks can achieve higher level of investments than regional
banks that are linked through an interbank market. Their advantage stems from the internal
allocation of capital that leads to cross-subsidizing investment projects across regions.11 As
a result, idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations in regional output are decreasing with the extent of cross-
regional banking in our model.
This prediction appears to be consistent with recent U.S. experience. Morgan, Rime and
Strahan (2004) document that barriers on inter-state banking in the U.S. began to be relaxed
in the early 1980’s. This process culminated with the passage of the Reigle-Neals act in 1994,
which eﬀectively removed most of the remaining barriers. They ﬁnd that the reduction in
these barriers was accompanied by an increase in the extent of interstate banking as well as
a reduction in idiosyncratic state output ﬂuctuations. Demyanyk, Ostergaard and Sorensen
(2004) draw similar conclusion for an increase in income smoothing across states following
U.S. banking de-regulation. They link this phenomenon to the role of banks in ﬁnancing small
businesses. In our model, this channel drives the result that broad banks lead to better inter-
regional risk sharing among bank-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs than regional banks with interbank
markets.
Furthermore, our analysis implies that broad banks which allocate capital internally can
endogenously generate aggregate uncertainty across regions.In an optimal allocation of capital,
the level of transfers between branches – and hence the level of investment – depends upon
the realized joint distribution of asset and liquidity shocks. It is exactly this feature which
generates endogenous aggregate uncertainty leading to higher aggregate output and more
volatility with broad banks than with regional banks and interbank markets.
All these ﬁndings indicate that regional banks with well-functioning interbank markets are
not a satisfactory alternative to broad banks. This also suggests that there may be signiﬁcant
gains from reducing barriers to cross-national banking. Currently, ﬁnancial market regulators
19in Europe are grappling with the question of how to structure cross-national ﬁnancial markets
and institutions to deepen ﬁnancial integration after the introduction of the Euro. Our
ﬁndings suggest that establishing pan-European interbank markets might not be enough. The
optimal policy may entail a signiﬁcant reduction in barriers to the cross-border operation of
intermediaries rather than simply the creation of a freely functioning cross-country interbank
market.
Last, our results may also shed some light on examples of regionally operating banks enter-
ing into informal (and sometimes formal) arrangements to provide mutual insurance against
shocks aﬀecting their assets and liabilities. These interbank relationships typically feature
some form of limited enforcement as banks are free to exit. For example, the arrangements
between cooperative banks in Germany appear to match the story of the model. Indepen-
dent, regionally operating cooperative banks and savings banks in Germany are arranged in
groups centered around a head organization.12 This organization coordinates liquidity provi-
sion among the smaller individual banks. In addition, these clubs explicitly agree to provide
insurance against asset shocks in ﬁnancial crises to one another. Another historical example
is provided by Gorton (1985), who documents that during periods of high liquidity needs,
American clearinghouses in the National Banking era would provide guarantees of members
assets.13 In both examples, there is active liquidity provision between banks and “insurance”
against asset shocks. We conclude that the commitment to provide insurance is credible in
these example, since leaving the arrangement could considerably aggravate access to liquidity.
Finally, we make some short remarks about the robustness of our results. A key assumption
is that the return on projects is independent of the value of collateral. This assumption
is reasonable for many projects where entrepreneurs post assets (i.e. personal homes) as
collateral for projects which do not directly use the collateral. In such a world, shocks to the
value of collateral lead to a reduction in loans by local banks but do not directly aﬀect the
return on the projects. Our results are robust to relaxing this assumption by allowing for
stochastic project returns. What is essential for our results, however, is that ﬂuctuations in
project returns are not perfectly positively correlated with the value of collateral. For such
cases, ﬂuctuations in the value of collateral will lead to ex-post variations in the wedges on
investment returns for depositors and entrepreneurs across regions.
20A second key assumption is that all the surplus from ﬁnancing projects goes to en-
trepreneurs. Our results, however, survive as long as entrepreneurs receive some surplus
from investment.14 Clearly, at t = 1, depositors would prefer that negative net present value
projects (from the perspective of the bank) are not funded, if this translated into higher
payouts to them. In contrast, entrepreneurs prefer to commit ex-ante to loan contracts that
incorporate the cross-subsidization of projects. What is key for our results is thus that banks
can commit not to recall loans to identiﬁable loss making projects (entrepreneurs) as long as
their solvency is maintained.
We also want to stress that the result on endogenous aggregate uncertainty generalizes to
any setting with multi-dimensional risk sharing. This result arises as long as there are two or
more distinct sources of uncertainty where the threat of exclusion from trades that mitigate
one source of risks can be used as “leverage” to induce or increase risk sharing along the
second dimension.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. It is optimal to set δV
i (s) = 1, since collateral is only valued by entrepreneurs. By
Assumption 2.1, this implies that the entrepreneur’s individual rationality constraints (6) and
(7) do not bind for any investment x0
i and x1
i(s). Also, investors are able to withdraw their
funds at stage t = 1 after they observe the realization of ˜ πi and ˜ θi. Then x0
i = 1 initiates the
maximum number of projects and is, thus, optimal.
Since all other individual rationality constraints are binding, liquidity needs at t = 1 imply
that x1
i(s) ≤ 1 − θi. The feasibility constraint (2) can be rewritten as
πic
V
B,i(s) ≤ (πiR − 1)x
1
i(s).
Suppose that πiR < 1. Any strictly positive x1
i(s) ∈ (0,1 − θi] violates the non-negativity of
cV
B,i(s). Hence, only x1
i(s) = 0 is feasible.
21If πiR ≥ 1, cV
B,i(s) ≥ 0. Since the objective function is strictly increasing in cV
B,i(s) and c0
B,i(s),
which are increasing in x1
i(s), it is optimal to set x1
i(s) = 1 − θi.
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
Proof. Let RIB = 1. The only feasible choice for every island with πiR < 1 is x1
i = 0. The
island is then indiﬀerent between any level of zi(s) and x1
i(s) = 1 and zi(s) = −θi for any
island with πiR ≥ 1 maximizes the planner’s objective function. The maximum total supply
of funds is given by
X
{i|πiR<1}








{i|πiR≥1} θi which is ensured by
Assumption 2.1. Hence, RIB = 1 is an equilibrium.
Next, we show uniqueness. Let RIB ∈ (1,R] and suppose there exists an equilibrium. In equi-
libirum the return on investment of funds is then strictly greater than the storage technology.
Hence, taking the interest rate RIB as given the planner chooses x1
i(s) + zi(s) = (1 − θi) for






















Hence, all funds are invested after liquidity needs have been satisﬁed. However, only at most
PN
i=1 x1
i(s) = N − Γ < N −
PN
i=1 θi projects can be ﬁnanced to satisfy a return of 1 for the
N −
PN
i=1 θi remaining investors at t = 2. Hence,
PN
i=1 zi(s) > 0, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
22Proof. The objective function (9) is strictly increasing in the number of projects ﬁnanced,
PN
i=1 x1
i(s). Suppose transfers from islands with πiR geq1 are given by ¯ Ti(s) and set transfers
for all other islands equal to πiR − 1 in a descending order starting from the largest πi
such that πi < 1/R until overall net transfers are zero. Set investment levels as given in
the Proposition. Such an allocation and transfers are clearly feasible, since Assumption 2.2
implies that islands receiving transfers and providing liquidity at t = 1 are distinct. The rate
of return for investors net of investment for investors is then just given by 0.




i(s) and, hence, cannot be optimal. Let  > 0 and consider the following,





   
   
1 −  for some n s.th. πn ≥ ˜ π
 for some m s.th. πm < ˜ π
x1
i(s) otherwise.
This leads to a rate of return net of investment for investors across all islands at t = 1 equal
to





i(s)(πiR − 1) < 0.
Therefore, to satisfy the individual rationality constraints (5) investment has to be reduced
further for some island i with 1/R > πi > πΓ. This reduces overall investment and, hence,
cannot be optimal.
23Notes
1One interpretation is that banking is a “contestable” market in the sense that new regional banks can
freely enter the market place and oﬀer contracts to local entrepreneurs and depositors.
2It is worth emphasizing that the relative ineﬃciency of interbank markets is not due to limited diversiﬁ-
cation, but limitations on cross-subsidizing regional investment.
3Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Clarke (2004) argue that the removal of interstate banking restrictions
was also accompanied by an increase in the growth rate of output in the respective states.
4Several other papers have argued that there is evidence supporting the important role of internal capital
markets for lending policies of regional bank branches (see for example Houston, James and Marcus (1997)
and Houston and James (1996).
5Allen and Gale (1997, 2000) also argue that banks (or ﬁnancial intermediaries) can improve upon market
outcomes, but through a diﬀerent channel. By accumulating reserves as a buﬀer against aggregate (genera-
tional) shocks, intermediaries are able to better smooth intertemporal consumption.
6For the formal construction of the probability space see Koeppl and MacGee (2001).
7For a complete characterization of the case when liquidity needs are high, see Koeppl and MacGee (2001).
8Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argue that demandable debt is the crucial feature characterizing banks. They
also provide evidence that elements such as suspension schemes were only used by banking systems and not
by individual banks.
9When the interest rate increases, the supply of funds falls. Planners that supply funds obtain more funds
to subsidize the locations projects. In other words, an increase in RIB relaxes the solvency constraint (12)
for such planners and reduces the supply of funds. The supply of funds, however, always decreases less than
the demand when interest rates rise.
10If the central planner could simply impose participation on the regions, it is immediate that he could
do at least as well as the interbank market. However, in an interbank market equilibrium, local planners
voluntarily choose to participate in inter-regional trade. Our argument for the superiority of broad banks
does not rely upon a central planner that can force regions into participating in trade across regions.
11One caveat is that we abstract from informational and managerial frictions that ﬁgure prominently in the
literature associated with internal capital markets in ﬁrms and conglomerates (see for example Stein (1997)
and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)).
12See Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre and Worms (2001) for an exposition on this feature
of the German banking sector.
2413See also Williamson (1989) for a historical comparison of Canadian and U.S. banking arrangements.
14In other words, what is required is that lenders do not receive all of the surplus from lending.
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